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Abstract
In their famous paper on the “Big Push”, Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) show
how the combination of increasing returns to scale at the firm level and pecuniary
externalities can give rise to a poverty trap, thereby formalising an old idea due to
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943). We develop in this paper an oligopoly model of the Big
Push that is very close in spirit to the Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny (MSV) model, but
in contrast to the MSV model it is easily extended to the case of an economy that is
open to international trade. Having a workable open-economy framework allows us
to address the question whether globalisation makes it easier or harder for a country
to escape from a poverty trap. Our model gives a definite answer to this question:
Globalisation makes it harder to escape from a poverty trap since the adoption of
the modern technology at the firm level is impeded by tougher competition in the
open economy.
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(DICE), Universitätsstr. 1, 40225 Düsseldorf, Germany; E-mail: jens.wrona@dice.hhu.de.
1 Introduction
“Let us assume that 20,000 unemployed workers [...] are taken from the land and put into
a large shoe factory. They receive wages substantially higher than their previous meagre
income in natura. [...] If these workers spent all their wages on shoes, a market for the
products of their enterprise would arise [...]. The trouble is that the workers will not spend
all their wages on shoes.”
“If, instead, one million unemployed workers were taken from the land and put, not into one
industry, but into a whole series of industries which produce the bulk of the goods on which
the workers would spend their wages, what was not true in the case of one shoe factory would
become true in the case of a whole system of industries: it would create its own additional
market, thus realising an expansion of world output with the minimum disturbance of the
world markets.”
(Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943, pp. 205-206)
Rosenstein-Rodan’s (1943) story of a shoe factory is often regarded as a prototypical description
of a poverty trap: a large modern factory, if established, would generate positive demand spill-
overs for other sectors, but it cannot break even unless modern factories in other sectors are
established that themselves generate comparable demand spillovers. A coordinated “Big Push”
towards modernisation across all sectors could therefore be achievable, while each sector on its
own would be bound to fail in its effort to modernise. Murphy et al. (1989), in a celebrated
and widely cited paper, were the first to formalize Rosenstein-Rodan’s (1943) idea of a Big
Push, in a closed economy model with a continuum of sectors, increasing returns to scale at
the firm level, and pecuniary externalities between sectors.1 In their model, a single firm in
each sector can upgrade its traditional constant-returns-to-scale (CRS) technology to a modern
increasing-returns-to-scale (IRS) technology, becoming a limit-pricing monopolist. Due to the
assumption that modern firms have to pay higher wages, modernisation in an individual sector
increases aggregate demand even if the individual firm suffers a loss from adopting the modern
technology. If technology upgrading decisions are coordinated across sectors, these mutually
beneficial demand spillovers can be fully internalised, rendering the adoption of the Pareto-
superior modern technology not only socially optimal but also individually profitable.
Although celebrated for the revival of what Krugman (1993) subsumes under the term
“high development theory” (cf. Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Nurkse, 1952; Fleming, 1955), the
Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny model early on faced the criticism that insufficient domestic demand
should matter much less as a cause for multiple equilibria in an economy that is open to
international trade (cf. Fn. 24 in Matsuyama (1991) and Fn. 3 in Stiglitz (1993)). Anticipating
this caveat, Murphy et al. (1989) spend a whole section on highlighting the importance of the
domestic market as an outlet for sales of domestic industries. Based on evidence from the
1There is a rich literature on the conditions under which various kinds of poverty traps may arise. Recent
surveys are provided by Azariadis and Stachurski (2005), Matsuyama (2008), and Kraay and McKenzie (2014).
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1950s, 1960s and 1970s (cf. Chenery and Syrquin, 1975; Chenery et al., 1986) they conclude
that industrial growth can be largely attributed to an expansion in domestic demand. Even
today most countries’ trading patterns are a far cry from the scenario of a world without any
trading frictions. Nevertheless, economies are much more open now than they used to be in the
past, with world imports of goods and services relative to world GDP strongly on the rise, from
12% in 1960 to 30% in 2011 (Head and Mayer, 2013).
The contribution of our paper is to develop a model that allows in a straightforward way the
analysis of an economy that is open to international trade, but at the same time is very close
in spirit to the original Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny model (henceforth MSV). In particular, our
model shares the property of the MSV model that poverty traps arise due to the co-existence of
pecuniary externalities between sectors and increasing returns to scale at the firm level. Where
we differ from the MSV model is in the assumed market structure and in the specification of
demand. This is important, since the original MSV model’s clever combination of asymmetric
Bertrand competition and Cobb-Douglas demand, which greatly simplifies the analysis of the
closed-economy model, at the same time immensely complicates the incorporation of interna-
tional trade: Quasi-rents from technology adoption and therefore the incentives to modernise
are eliminated if two or more modern firms from different countries compete over the prices of
homogeneous goods and therefore end up in the Bertrand paradox.2 And Cournot competition
is not a natural alternative in the MSV model, since the demand is assumed to be iso-elastic.3
In our model, we stick to the assumption from MSV that firms face a binary choice between
CRS and IRS technologies, and introduce this assumption into a general equilibrium oligopoly
model à la Neary (2003) with Cournot competition and linear demand, which straightforwardly
allows the analysis of a trading world economy with many symmetric countries.
Within this new framework firms charge variable mark-ups, which – unlike in the MSV model
– are not decoupled from the model’s general equilibrium effects. As a consequence, our model
features a new equilibrium type. In addition to the two polar cases familiar from Murphy et al.
(1989), in which the modern IRS technology is adopted either in no sector or simultaneously by
all sectors, there also is the possibility of an equilibrium with incomplete industrialisation, in
which the IRS technology is adopted only by a subset of all sectors.4 The variability of mark-ups
2Intuitively, the Bertrand paradox only arises under free trade. In the presence of non-prohibitive (variable)
trade costs modern firms in each country would resort to a limit pricing strategy, slightly undercutting the foreign
competitors’ unit costs. With entry into the foreign market being effectively blocked, investments into increasing-
returns-to-scale technologies would be again constrained by the (initial) size of the domestic market, potentially
giving rise to multiple equilibria in the open economy. As an obvious drawback of this modelling strategy the
open-economy equilibrium would feature zero international trade (cf. Neary and Leahy, 2015).
3As pointed out by Neary (2016), with iso-elastic demand quantities are strategic complements for many
parameter values. Moreover, reaction functions may be non-monotonic. Bandyopadhyay (1997) demonstrates
the complexities that arise with iso-elastic demands even in the simplest Cournot duopoly.
4See Paternostro (1997) for a model of poverty traps, in which equilibria with incomplete industrialisation are
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thereby matters in two ways. On the one hand, early adopters of the modern IRS technology
can (more) easily divert expenditure away from other sectors by charging lower mark-ups. On
the other hand, mark-ups are generally decreasing throughout all sectors, as workers’ wages
(and, hence, firms’ costs) are steadily increasing in the process of industrialisation. Both effects
benefit early adopters vis-à-vis their later followers, such that the gains from modernisation
are gradually reduced as the modern IRS technology is adopted in more and more sectors,
eventually leading to an equilibrium in which technology adoption pays off only for firms in a
subset of all industries.
We characterise a precise condition under which our model is capable of producing multi-
ple equilibria.5 Having established the existence of multiple equilibria, we derive a sufficient
condition for the existence of a poverty trap, in which the economy might end up being caught
in a low-welfare equilibrium characterised by incomplete industrialisation. Thereby it is im-
portant to disentangle the two welfare effects that are associated with a gradual industriali-
sation. Intuitively, if the modern technology is socially efficient, a rising share of modernised
sectors is associated with rising welfare as the economy’s average technology improves. How-
ever, as demonstrated by Neary (2016), consumers also benefit from the possibility to shift
their consumption towards relatively cheaper goods, which becomes possible in an incompletely
industrialised equilibrium, that is characterised by an inter-sectoral heterogeneity in firm-level
productivities. With multiple equilibria it therefore has to be ensured that the incompletely
industrialised equilibrium is actually inferior in terms of welfare relative to the equilibrium with
complete industrialisation.
When analysing the role of globalisation, we focus on the pro-competitive effect of interna-
tional trade, which is a specific feature of our oligopolistic trade model, that cannot be studied
within canonical models of monopolistic competition with constant mark-ups (cf. Krugman and
Elizondo, 1996; Sachs and Warner, 1999; Trindade, 2005). In contrast to this class of models, in
which an increase in the number of trading partners in the presence of external increasing returns
to scale (cf. Ethier, 1982) typically is associated with a lifting-all-boats effect of globalisation,
we find that the vicious cycle of poverty in our model is reinforced through the pro-competitive
effect of international trade. In particular, we show that for an economy, which, due to an
insufficiently small market, is initially trapped in an incompletely industrialised low-welfare
derived under the additional assumption of a positive fixed cost externality.
5Since we place our analysis in a perfectly integrated world economy, it is worth to note that the existence
of multiple equilibria does not depend on the assumption that world trade is sufficiently costly, as suggested by
Matsuyama (1991, Fn. 34) or by Stiglitz (1993, Fn. 3). As in a closed economy with initially too small market
size, a multiplicity of equilibria can also arise in an open economy if the world market initially is too small.
In either case, industrialisation becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy if the adoption of the modern technology is
associated with a sufficient expansion of the market.
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equilibrium, it becomes more difficult to adopt the welfare-enhancing modern IRS technology,
given that trade liberalisation is associated with an erosion of firms’ operating margin due to
intensified competition from abroad.
For the reasons explained above, Murphy et al.’s (1989) original Big Push framework has
mostly been used to conduct closed-economy analyses (cf. Matsuyama, 1992; Gans, 1997; Ya-
mada, 1999; Ciccone, 2002; Mehlum et al., 2003; Bjorvatn and Coniglio, 2012). Studies inter-
ested in the role that international trade plays in the context of poverty traps have typically
adapted models with constant mark-ups and external increasing returns to scale (cf. Ethier,
1982): Krugman and Elizondo (1996) focus on multiple spatial equilibria within a New Eco-
nomic Geography (NEG) model (cf. Krugman, 1991) and show that the multiplicity of equilib-
ria is eliminated if the economy becomes sufficiently open for international trade. According to
Sachs and Warner (1999) the relative strength of (external) increasing returns to scale in non-
traded versus traded goods industries determines whether a resource boom can substitute for
a Big Push. Trindade (2005) uses a model with external increasing returns to scale in the pro-
duction of tradable intermediates to show that the lifting-all-boats effect of export-promoting
policies can push an economy from a low- to a high-welfare equilibrium. All these models have
in common that both the multiplicity of equilibria and the gains from trade are derived from
the presence of external increasing returns to scale à la Ethier (1982), and it is therefore no
surprise that a trade-induced increasing in market size appears as a convenient way out of a
pre-existing poverty trap. By disentangling the multiplicity of equilibria from the source of the
gains from trade, our model sheds light on a new complementary channel (the pro-competitive
effect of international trade), which turns out to be pivotal in shaping a country’s prospects of
breaking the vicious circle of poverty, but has so far been neglected in the literature on poverty
traps.
Building on the seminal contributions of Neary (2003, 2016), the basic concept of General
Oligopolistic Equilibrium (GOLE) has been applied to many contexts, including the analysis
of cross-border mergers (cf. Neary, 2007), labour market imperfections (cf. Bastos and Kreick-
emeier, 2009; Egger and Koch, 2012; Egger and Etzel, 2012; Kreickemeier and Meland, 2013;
Egger et al., 2015), and multi-product firms (cf. Eckel and Neary, 2010; Egger and Koch, 2012;
Eckel et al., 2015).6 Although we are the first to model an endogenous technology choice à la
Murphy et al. (1989) in General Oligopolistic Equilibrium, there are some natural parallels to
the work of Bastos and Straume (2012), who endogenise the range of products, and to the work
of Neary and Tharakan (2012), who endogenise the mode of competition.
6See Colacicco (2015) for a recent review of the literature.
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The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we provide a short summary of the original
Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny model, following the exposition in Krugman (1993). Section 3 then
characterises our model and derives a general formulation of firms’ technology upgrading deci-
sion. Section 4 is structured in three Subsections: We prove the existence of multiple equilibria
in a global economy in Subsection 4.1. In the subsequent Subsection 4.2 we then demonstrate
under which condition this multiplicity of equilibria results in a poverty trap. Finally, in Sub-
section 4.3 it is shown that opening up to free trade does substitute for a Big Push that would
be required to escape from a pre-existing poverty trap. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Big Push Model of Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny
We begin our analysis with a short presentation of the Big Push model by Murphy et al.
(1989). Consider a closed economy with a continuum of sectors z ∈ [0, 1] and Cobb Douglas
utility U [x(z)] = exp[
∫ 1
0 ln x(z)dz], in which x(z) denotes consumption of good z. The economy
is endowed with a fixed supply of labour L > 0, which also serves as numéraire, implying
unitary wages w
!
= 1. In each sector a competitive fringe of firms has access to a traditional
technology yT (z) = lT (z) (denoted by superscript T ) with a unitary labour input coefficient. A
single one of those firms in each sector also has access to a modern technology with increasing
returns to scale (denoted by superscript M), which is characterised by production function
yM(z) = max{0, [lM (z) − F ]/γ}, with γ ∈ (0, 1) as marginal labour requirement, and F ∈ (0, L)
as fixed labour requirement. To adopt the modern technology and to become a monopolist,
firms in each sector have to pay an exogenously given (multiplicative) wage premium v ≥ 1.
Krugman (1993) has a particularly transparent graphical representation of the model, which
is reproduced here as Figure 1a. The Figure relates per capita labour input l̂(z) ≡ l(z)/L to
per capita sectoral output ŷ(z) ≡ y(z)/L with f ∈ (0, 1) being defined as f ≡ F/L. Solid lines
represent per capita output, revenue and labour costs for the traditional technology as a ray
from the origin with slope 1, and per capita output and revenue for the modern technology as
a line through point f with slope 1/γ. Per capita labour costs for the modern technology are
given by the dashed line with slope v. If all sectors use the same technology i ∈ {T, M}, labour
market clearing implies L =
∫ 1
0 l
i(z)dz =
∫ 1
0 l
idz = li (or equivalently l̂i(z) = 1), and per capita
output under the traditional and modern technologies equals ŷT (z) = 1 and ŷM(z) = (1 − f)/γ,
respectively. Figure 1a illustrates the interesting case of ŷM(z) > ŷT (z), in which the adoption
of the modern technology throughout the economy would be a Pareto improvement, requiring
(1 − f)/γ > 1 or, equivalently, f + γ < 1.
The famous result of Murphy et al. (1989) is that with v > 1 the potential for a poverty
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Figure 1: The Big Push
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trap, i.e. a situation with multiple equilibria in which industrialisation (i) would constitute a
Pareto improvement, (ii) is not profitable for individual firms, and therefore does not happen,
in a decentralised equilibrium, (iii) is profitable for all firms, and therefore does happen, if
industrialisation is coordinated across sectors. To illustrate this result, suppose a single firm
in a particular sector starts to modernise. The modern firm charges the same unitary (limit)
price as the traditional firms and sells the same quantity ŷT (z) = ŷM(z) = 1 (each sector only
marginally contributes to the economy as a whole such that income effects are absent in this
case). To produce this quantity the modern firm incurs labour cost (f +γ)v, which may be (and
in Figure 1a is) larger than 1, thereby rendering modernisation by a single firm unprofitable,
even though f + γ < 1 and therefore modernisation in all sectors would be Pareto efficient.
Now suppose firms in all sectors modernise simultaneously. This move increases aggregate
demand, letting all firms produce output (equal to revenue) ŷM(z) = (1 − f)/γ, while labour
cost is equal to v. With (1 − f)/γ > v, as drawn in Figure 1a, simultaneous modernisation of
all sectors is profitable. Putting together the parameter constraints, multiple equilibria occur
in Murphy et al. (1989) for
1 − γv > f > 1 − γv
v
, (1)
in which the first inequality ensures that coordinated modernisation is profitable, whereas the
second inequality ensures that individual modernisation is not profitable. The exogenous wage
premium v > 1 is crucial for the existence of multiple equilibria, since it gives rise to a pecuniary
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demand externality, which is rationally ignored by individual firms, who consequently under-
invest into the adoption of the modern technology. By coordinating their technology choices
across the continuum of sectors, all firms equally contribute to an increase in aggregate de-
mand, from which they mutually benefit, rendering the adoption of the Pareto superior modern
technology profitable for each single firm as long as f is in the interval given by inequality (1).
Figure 1b depicts the boundary condition f = 1−γv as a black solid line, and the boundary
condition f = (1 − γv)/v as a black dotted line. Combinations of f and γ between both lines
lead to multiple equilibria as described. In the red parameter space no sector modernises, while
industrialisation always succeeds in the green parameter space.
3 Technology Upgrading in General Oligopolistic Equilibrium
In this section, we show how firms’ technology upgrading decision as originally formalised in
Murphy et al. (1989) can be incorporated into an otherwise standard General Oligopolistic
Equilibrium (GOLE) model. Following Neary (2003, 2016), we adopt continuum-quadratic
preferences
U [x(z)] =
∫ 1
0
u[x(z)]dz with u[x(z)] = αx(z) − 1
2
βx(z)2, (2)
which results in a (perceived) linear demand system
p(z) =
α − βx(z)
λ
and x(z) =
α − λp(z)
β
with λ =
α
∫ 1
0 p(z)dz − βY∫ 1
0 p(z)
2dz
, (3)
implying well-behaved best-response functions under Cournot competition.7 Thereby, we denote
sectoral demand by x(z), prices by p(z), and aggregate income by Y . Without loss of generality
we can normalise preference parameters α, β
!
= 1, such that the satiation point equals α/β = 1.
Marginal utility of income λ is a non-linear function of aggregate variables only, and therefore
may be interpreted as a “sufficient statistic” for how firms perceive the rest of the economy as
a whole. In general equilibrium, we are free in the choice of a numéraire, and following Neary
(2003, 2016) we choose marginal utility for this role, which implies that all prices are defined
relative to the cost of marginal utility, which is given by λ−1, the inverse of the marginal utility
of income. With λ−1 ≡ 1, prices have the interpretation of real prices at the margin, and the
same is true for wage rates.
7Continuum-quadratic preferences are a sub-class of the Gorman polar form (cf. Gorman, 1961). Quasi-
homotheticity ensures consistent aggregation of individual demand functions within and across countries. See
Neary (2016) for a detailed discussion of the demand system in Eq. (3).
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We assume an integrated world economy with m ≥ 1 symmetric countries, each having a con-
tinuum of symmetric sectors z ∈ [0, 1] with n ≥ 1 symmetric firms in each sector. Competition is
assumed to be Cournot.8 The variable z̃ denotes the endogenous share of sectors using the mod-
ern technology, and it is shown below that all other model variables can be expressed as a func-
tion of z̃. The households’ budget constraint is given by E(z̃) = z̃pM(z̃)x̄M (z̃)+(1−z̃)pT (z̃)x̄T (z̃),
with pi as the price for goods produced by firms of type i ∈ {T, M} and x̄i as the total quantity
consumed of the respective goods. It is helpful for the following analysis to define the new
variables
θ(z̃) ≡ z̃p
M(z̃)x̄M (z̃)
z̃pM(z̃)x̄M(z̃) + (1 − z̃)pT (z̃)x̄T (z̃) ∈ [0, 1], (4)
as the share of expenditure allocated to modern sectors, and
ηM(z̃) ≡ θ(z̃)
z̃
∈ (0, ∞) and ηT (z̃) ≡ 1 − θ(z̃)
1 − z̃ ∈ (0, ∞) (5)
as the sectoral expenditure multipliers, which are defined as expenditure allocated to a specific
sector relative to the average expenditure per sector. Following Neary (2003), we assume that
all firms within a given sector choose simultaneously between the traditional and the modern
technology, and focus on symmetric industry equilibria with nri(z̃) = pi(z̃)xi(z̃) ∀ i ∈ {T, M}.
Firm-level revenues can then be written as a function of aggregate expenditure:
ri(z̃) =
ηi(z̃)E(z̃)
n
∀ i ∈ {M, T } . (6)
Using µi(z̃) ∈ [0, 1] ∀ i ∈ {M, T } to denote the sector-level operating margin, we can express
firms’ profits as:
πi(z̃) =
µi(z̃)ηi(z̃)E(z̃)
n
− Iiw(z̃)F ∀ i ∈ {M, T } , (7)
with Ii ∈ {0, 1} as an indicator function assuming a value of IM = 1 for i = M and a value of
IT = 0 for i = T .
Aggregate expenditure equals aggregate income Y (z̃), which in turn is the sum of total
profits and aggregate labour income w(z̃)L:
Y (z̃) = z̃nπM(z̃) + (1 − z̃)nπT (z̃) + w(z̃)L. (8)
8Exploiting the model’s symmetry, we can drop all country-, sector-, and firm-specific indices to save on space
and notation.
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Substituting πT (z̃) and πM (z̃) from Eq. (7) allows us to write aggregate income as
Y (z̃) = A(z̃)w(z̃)(1 − z̃nf)L, (9)
in which f ≡ F/L ∈ (0, 1/n), and where
A(z̃) ≡ 1
1 − θ(z̃)µM (z̃) − [1 − θ(z̃)]µT (z̃) ≥ 1, (10)
captures the extent to which production workers’ labour income w(z̃)(1 − z̃nf)L is scaled up
through the redistribution of operating profits.
Using the income-expenditure equality again, we substitute Y (z̃) from Eq. (9) into Eq.
(7), which allows us to write the profit differential that governs the marginal firm’s technology
upgrading decision as
πM(z̃) − πT (z̃) = A(z̃)w(z̃) [µM(z̃)ηM (z̃) − µT (z̃)ηT (z̃)(1 − nf) − nf ] L/n ≷ 0. (11)
Notably, the sign of the inequality, and therefore the upgrading decision of the marginal firm,
depends on z̃ only via the operating margins µi(z̃) and the sectoral expenditure shares ηi(z̃).
Without loss of generality we fix the number of firms in each country and sector at n = 1,
such that the variable m not only refers to the number of countries, but also to the number
of firms in the global market. Table 1 then summarises firm- and sector-level outcomes. Since
the marginal cost of modern firms is lower by a factor 1/γ in comparison to traditional firms,
modern firms set lower prices pM(z̃) < pT (z̃), sell larger quantities xM(z̃) > xT (z̃), and therefore
earn larger revenues rM(z̃) > rT (z̃). As a consequence modern firms not only benefit from ex-
penditure diversion towards low-price sectors via ηM (z̃) > ηT (z̃) but also from a larger operating
margin µM(z̃) > µT (z̃).
Table 1: Model Outcomes under Cournot competition
i M T
pi(z̃) 1+mγw(z̃)1+m
1+mw(z̃)
1+m
xi(z̃) 1−γw(z̃)(1+m)
1−w(z̃)
(1+m)
ri(z̃) [1+mγw(z̃)][1−γw(z̃)]
(1+m)2
[1+mw(z̃)][1−w(z̃)]
(1+m)2
ηi(z̃) [1+mγw(z̃)][1−γw(z̃)]
z̃[1+mγw(z̃)][1−γw(z̃)]+(1−z̃)[1+mw(z̃)][1−w(z̃)]
[1+mw(z̃)][1−w(z̃)]
z̃[1+mγw(z̃)][1−γw(z̃)]+(1−z̃)[1+mw(z̃)][1−w(z̃)]
µi(z̃) 1−γw(z̃)1+mγw(z̃)
1−w(z̃)
1+mw(z̃)
Conveniently, all variables in Table 1 only depend on model parameters and on the endoge-
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nous share z̃ ∈ [0, 1] of industries using the modern technology. Thereby the wage rate w(z̃)
can be obtained from the full employment condition L = z̃[γmxM (z̃) + F ] + (1 − z̃)mxT (z̃) as
w(z̃) =
1
z̃γ2 + 1 − z̃
[
(z̃γ + 1 − z̃) − 1 + m
m
(1 − z̃f)L
]
≥ 0, (12)
in which
L <
m
1 + m
min
{
1,
γ(1 − γ)
1 − f − γ2
}
(13)
is assumed to ensure full employment at positive wages w(z̃) > 0 for all values of z̃.9
4 Multiple Equilibria, Poverty Traps, and International Trade
In this section, we first show under which conditions multiple equilibria exist in our model.
We then establish a sufficient condition under which the multiplicity of equilibria results in a
poverty trap. Finally, it is demonstrated that opening up for free trade does not substitute for
a Big Push, that would be necessary to break the vicious circle of poverty.
4.1 Multiple Equilibria in a Global Economy
Proposition 1 summarises the different types of equilibria and establishes a straightforward
condition under which a multiplicity of equilibria exists.
Proposition 1 For L ≥ L̄(m) with
L̄(m) ≡ m
2[m +
√
2m(1 + m)]
,
three types of equilibria exist: no industrialisation, complete industrialisation, and incomplete
industrialisation. For L < L̄(m) there is in addition a parameter range leading to multiple
equilibria, in which the possibilities of complete and incomplete industrialisation co-exist.
Proof See Appendix A.2.
From Eq. (11), the profit gain from modernisation is more likely to be positive if firms using
the modern (traditional) technology have (low) operating margins µi(z̃), high (low) sectoral
expenditure multipliers ηi(z̃), and a sufficiently small fixed labour requirement F . Under the
parameter constraint imposed by inequality (13), the wage rate w(z̃) in Eq. (12) is increasing
9See Appendix A.1 for a proof. Highly inefficient technologies characterised by f ≥ 1 − γ2 are excluded to
ensure that the right hand side of inequality (13) is positive.
10
in the share z̃ of modernised sectors.10 As a consequence, there is a first mover advantage for
early adopters, which at low wages w(z̃′) < w(z̃′′) for z̃′ < z̃′′ benefit from higher operating
margins µM(z̃′) > µM(z̃′′). In addition, by setting lower prices pM(z̃) < pT (z̃) vis-à-vis all
traditional firms, modern firms divert expenditure away from their traditional competitors in
the sectors z ∈ (z̃, 1], which is reflected by ηM (z̃) > ηT (z̃). Intuitively, the diversion effect is
most pronounced for the first adopters, who offer lower prices vis-à-vis the traditional firms in all
other sectors, and therefore experience the largest boost in their sectoral demand. In contrast,
the last technology adopters, when upgrading to the modern technology, only match up to all
other firms already offering low prices, thereby ensuring that expenditure is (again) allocated
equally across all sectors. In summary, pioneering firms benefit from inter-sectoral demand
diversion ηM (0) > ηM (1) as well as from initially high operating margins µM(0) > µM(1). As
the modern technology is sequentially adopted by more and more sectors, the marginal firms’
incentives for technology adoption are gradually eroded. This explains why, in contrast to the
Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny model, partial industrialisation is a possibility in our model. 11
Multiple equilibria in our setting arise for the same fundamental reason as in Murphy et al.
(1989): Firms cannot fully appropriate the returns to their technology investment, which gives
rise to a positive pecuniary demand externality, even if the adoption of the modern technology
is associated with a loss for the marginal firm in sector z̃. In our model, this externality
lies in the modernisation-induced increase in the economy-wide wage rate w(z̃) that shifts out
demand for all sectors z ∈ [0, 1] but is rationally ignored by firms considering the adoption
of the modern technology.12 Whether this effect is strong enough to generate the possibility
of multiple equilibria depends on the economy-wide labour supply L relative to the threshold
value L̄(m). Intuitively, if L is smaller than L̄(m), labour is scarce relative to the number of
firms m in the world market, leading to a steeply increasing wage function w(z̃), and therefore
to a sufficiently large wage externality.13 In this case parameter combinations of f and γ exist
10Technology upgrading has two countervailing effects on firms’ labour demand and, hence, on the equilibrium
wage rate. On the one hand, the introduction of a labour-saving modern technology is associated with a reduction
in firms’ labour demand at the intensive margin (i.e. per unit of output). On the other hand, we find that,
by reducing the marginal cost of production, the modern technology allows firms to lower their price and to
expand their production, which increases labour demand at the extensive margin. By imposing condition L <
[m/(1 + m)][γ(1 − γ)/(1 − f − γ2)] we ensure that aggregate demand is sufficiently elastic for the effect at the
extensive margin to be dominant.
11Following the same logic it can be shown that ηT (0) > ηT (1) and µT (0) > µT (1) such that the “replacement
effect” of technology adoption familiar from Arrow (1962) is smaller for late rather than for early adopters.
Reassuringly, we demonstrate in Appendix A.2 that the worsening of firms’ outside option is always of second
order, such that we have πM (0) − πT (0) ≥ πM(1) − πT (1), which inevitably results in an equilibrium with
incomplete industrialisation.
12By contrast, in the original Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny model the wage rate in the traditional sector is con-
stant, and therefore a sufficiently large exogenous wage premium of modern sectors is needed to generate the
corresponding effect.
13For a given level of L a higher number m of firms is associated with tougher competition in the world market
and lower operating margins µi(z̃). For firms it therefore becomes increasingly difficult to appropriate the returns
11
that imply multiple equilibria.
Figure 2: Multiple Equilibria under Cournot Competition
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Figure 2 illustrates the different equilibria in technology space. The boundary condition
πM(0) = πT (0), represented by the dotted line, separates the red area, in which no firm mod-
ernises, from the yellow area, in which the first firm finds it profitable to modernise. Crucial for
the existence of multiple equilibria is the relative position of boundary conditions πM(1) = πT (1),
represented by the dashed line, and πM (1) = πT (0), represented by the solid line. Boundary
condition πM(1) = πT (1) separates the area below (in green), in which it is profitable for each in-
dividual sector to modernise, and therefore the modern technology is adopted by all firms, from
the area above, in which this is not the case. By contrast, boundary condition πM(1) = πT (0)
separates the area below, in which coordinated modernisation of all sectors is profitable, from
the area above, in which this is not the case. For parameter combinations in the green and yellow
striped area between both boundary conditions, the coordinated modernisation of all sectors is
profitable, but the individual modernisation of all sectors is not. Therefore, multiple equilibria
exist in this area, with the two possible outcomes being partial modernisation or full moderni-
sation. If L is so large that multiple equilibria are ruled out, boundary condition πM(1) = πT (0)
to their technology investments, which means that the positive pecuniary wage externality is more likely to be
sufficiently large for a multiplicity of equilibria to arise, and this is why L̄(m) is increasing in m.
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lies strictly below boundary condition πM (1) = πT (1), and therefore coordination across sectors
cannot be instrumental in achieving full modernisation.14
4.2 Multiple Equilibria and Poverty Traps
In the Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny model, the multiplicity of equilibria implies the existence of a
poverty trap, since for those parameter combinations that are compatible with multiple equi-
libria it is always the case that the coordinated equilibrium (full industrialisation) welfare dom-
inates the decentralised equilibrium (no industrialisation). This is different in our model: It is
possible that in the multiple equilibria regime of our model the coordinated equilibrium (full
industrialisation) is welfare dominated by the decentralised equilibrium (partial industrialisa-
tion). However, it is possible to provide a sufficient condition for the coordinated equilibrium to
welfare dominate the decentralised equilibrium in all cases that give rise to multiple equilibria.
Proposition 2 Under the sufficient condition L ∈ (L(m), L̄(m)), where L(m) is plotted to-
gether with L̄(m) in Figure 3, full industrialisation is welfare superior to partial industrialisa-
tion, and therefore every regime featuring multiple equilibria constitutes a poverty trap.
Proof See Appendix A.3.
Intuitively, we show in the proof that under the parameter constraint given in Proposition
2 indirect utility
U (z̃) =
1
2
{
1 − [
∫ z̃
0 p
M(z̃)dz +
∫ 1
z̃ p
T (z̃)dz − Y (z̃)]2
∫ z̃
0 [p
M (z̃)]2dz +
∫ 1
z̃ [p
T (z̃)]2dz
}
(14)
increases monotonically in z̃, and therefore any equilibrium with full industrialisation welfare
dominates any equilibrium with partial industrialisation. As in the Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny
model, it is always true in our model that full industrialisation (z̃ = 1) welfare dominates a
situation with no industrialisation (z̃ = 0), as long as f +γ < 1. But in general U(z̃) can have an
interior maximum in our model, and welfare in an equilibrium with complete industrialisation
may then be surpassed by welfare in an equilibrium with incomplete industrialisation, such that
U(1) < U(z̃) for some values of z̃ ∈ (0, 1). It is this case that our parameter constraint excludes.
To understand where the (potential) non-monotonicity in welfare U(z̃) originates from, it
is important to note that improvements in the average technology level are not the sole reason
for consumers’ welfare gains. The gradual adoption of the modern technology by more and
more sectors is also accompanied by a welfare-relevant change in the dispersion of technology
14An interactive version of Figure 2 is available from the authors upon request as a Computable Data File
(CDF), which can be used in combination with Wolfram’s CDF-player (available as a free download under:
www.wolfram.com/cdf-player/.)
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Figure 3: Technology Upgrading and Aggregate Welfare
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levels across sectors. In particular, it is shown by Neary (2016) that a mean-preserving spread
in an economy’s technology distribution is associated with a higher level of welfare as it allows
consumers to substitute towards relatively less costly products. Due to the binary technology
choice in our model, the variance σ2(z̃) = z̃(1 − z̃)(1 − γ)2 ≥ 0 of the technology levels γ takes
the particular simple form of an inverted U, with a unique maximum at z̃max = 1/2 and values
of σ2(0) = σ2(1) = 0 if the modern technology is adopted either by all sectors or not at all.
If aggregate welfare is sufficiently sensitive to the dispersion of technology levels, the inverted
U-shape in σ2(z̃) carries over to U(z̃).
4.3 Poverty Traps and International Trade
We now analyse the effect of international trade on an economy that is caught in a poverty
trap, focussing on the case, in line with Proposition 2, that L ∈ (L(m), L̄(m)). An increase in
the level of international trade is modelled in the simplest possible way as an increase in the
number of trading countries m. We get the following result:
Proposition 3 An economy cannot escape from a poverty trap by opening up to free interna-
tional trade with more partner countries.
Proof See Appendix A.4.
Intuitively, an important explanation for our strong result lies in the fact that the funda-
mentals of our model are completely symmetric across sectors and countries, and therefore the
resource allocation in any economy with identical industry equilibria (e.g. with no industrialisa-
tion or with complete industrialisation) is socially efficient, and does not depend on the number
of firms or the size of their mark-ups (cf. Lerner, 1934). The sole impact of opening up for
14
international trade in such a setting is to enhance competition, which alters the distribution of
constant (total) industry rents to the disadvantage of firms, which now face a more competitive
environment with lower operating margins.
Figure 4: Multiple Equilibria and International Trade
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The result stated in Proposition 3 is further illustrated in Figure 4, which replicates in
blue the two boundary conditions πM(1) = πT (1) and πM(1) = πT (0) from Figure 2, enclosing
the area of multiple equilibria. As we show in Appendix A.4, an increase in m shifts both
boundary condition down, and the post-change boundaries are given in red. As a result, there
are now parameter combinations, shown in Figure 4 as the yellow shaded area, for which full
industrialisation is no longer a possibility, even if the sectors were able to coordinate. In addition,
in the area between the blue and red dashed boundary conditions, there is the newly arising
possibility of a poverty trap, since the respective combinations of f and γ are now in the area
of multiple equilibria, while before the increase in m the only stable equilibrium was one with
full industrialisation.
As suggested above, the strongly negative result about the role of international trade in
Proposition 3 would be potentially mitigated if country asymmetries allowed for some gains from
trade. In order to illustrate this point, we briefly sketch an asymmetric version of our model.
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For simplicity and in order to maintain the model’s basic symmetry we focus on the specific
example of a two-country world in which Home has a comparative advantage in all industries
indexed between 0 and 1/2 on the unit interval (modelled through symmetric variable labour
input coefficients δ < 1), while the comparative advantage of Foreign lies in the production
of goods which are indexed by values between 1/2 and 1 (again modelled through symmetric
variable labour input coefficients δ < 1). Intuitively, if δ is sufficiently small, the free trade
equilibrium is characterised by complete specialisation as in Dornbusch et al. (1977). For the
surviving firms a shift from autarky to free trade then is tantamount to an (exogenous) increase
in market size, which makes it easier to escape from any pre-existing poverty trap. Notably,
the unambiguously positive impact of international trade here is derived in the absence of a
pro-competitive trade effect, given that the surviving firms do not have to fear any competition
from abroad. For more general productivity distributions as for example discussed by Neary
(2016) there always exists a “cone of diversification” in which firms from both countries can
coexist under oligopolistic competition. The link between international trade and technology
upgrading then depends on whether the respective firm stems from a sector with comparative
advantage or comparative disadvantage. Advantaged firms gain market shares, which potentially
compensate for a tougher competition through international trade. Disadvantaged firms on the
contrary suffer from the loss of market shares and from the more intense competition in the
global market. Since disadvantaged firms are also likely candidates for a late adoption of the
modern technology, there is a fair chance that a pre-existing poverty trap gets aggravated
through international trade.
5 Conclusion
By incorporating a binary technology choice into a General Oligopolistic Equilibrium (GOLE)
with Cournot competition, we demonstrate the existence of poverty traps in a global economy.
Thereby, our model not only refutes the popular misconception, that in an open economy insuf-
ficient (initial) market size becomes meaningless as an argument for economies to be trapped
in low-income equilibria – as even the world market might turn out to be initially too small
to support the decentralised adoption of a socially optimal technology. We also demonstrate
that with variable mark-ups it is possible to (endogenously) generate a poverty trap without
the assumption of an exogenously given wage premium as in Murphy et al. (1989).
Within our more general framework three possible equilibrium types exist. As in the orig-
inal Big Push model, our economy may end up in one of two polar cases, featuring either no
or complete industrialisation. However, in addition there also is an equilibrium with incom-
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plete industrialisation, in which the modern technology is adopted by firms in some, yet not
in all, industries. We show that there exist parameter combinations for which our model fea-
tures a multiplicity of equilibria, characterised by incomplete versus complete industrialisation.
Thereby, the rationale for a poverty trap is the same as in Murphy et al. (1989): Firms rationally
ignore the pecuniary demand externality that in our model arises from endogenously increasing
wages, and they therefore under-invest in the adoption of the modern technology in a decen-
tralised market equilibrium. Since international trade in an environment with variable mark-ups
is associated with a pro-competitive effect, firms face shrinking operating margins, which limits
their ability to appropriate the returns from technology upgrading, thereby aggravating the
underinvestment problem and reinforcing the vicious circle of poverty.
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A Appendix
Some of the proofs contained in this Appendix require tedious transformations. To make it
easier for the interested reader to check the correctness of these intermediate steps, all com-
putations have been implemented in Mathematica. A Computable Data File (CDF), which
can be used in combination with Wolfram’s CDF-player (available as free download under:
www.wolfram.com/cdf-player/), can be obtained from the authors upon request.
A.1 Derivation of Eq. (13)
We assume L < m/(1 + m), which ensures w(0) > 0 as well as L < [m/(1 + m)](1 − γ)/{[(1 −
f)/γ] − γ}, which guarantees that w′(z̃) > 0. Together, we have L < [m/(1 + m)] min{1, (1 −
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γ)/([(1−f)/γ]−γ)}. As we assume L < m/(1+m) to hold throughout, we have to ensure that
f > g(γ) = g(γ; m, L) ≡ (1 − γ)[(1 + m)(1 + γ) − mγ/L]
(1 + m)
, (A.1)
which is equivalent to L < [m/(1 + m)](1 − γ)/([(1 − f)/γ] − γ).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Substituting Y (z̃) from Eq. (9) back into πT (z̃) and πM (z̃) from Eq. (7) yields
πT (0) =
1 − w(0)
1 + m
L and πT (1) =
[1 − w(1)]2
(1 + m)[1 − γw(1)]
L − F
γ
, (A.2)
as well as
πM(0) =
[1 − γw(0)]2
(1 + m)[1 − w(0)]L − w(0)F and π
M(1) =
1 − γw(1)
1 + m
L − F
γ
− w(1)F, (A.3)
which are evaluated at z̃ = 0 and z̃ = 1, respectively. Substituting w(0) from Eq. (12) into
πM(0) and πT (0) from Eqs. (A.3) and (A.2) allows us to solve for
fF (γ) = fF (γ; m, L) ≡
(1 + m)(1 − γ2) + (1 − γ)2m/L
(1 + m)2
, (A.4)
with fF (γ) <=> f being equivalent to π
M (0) <=> πT (0). Substituting w(1) from Eq. (12)
into πM (1) and πT (1) from Eqs. (A.3) and (A.2) allows us to solve for
fL(γ) = fL(γ; m, L) ≡
(1 + m)(1 − γ2) − γ(1 − γ)2m/L
(1 + m)(1 + mγ2)
, (A.5)
with fL(γ) <=> f being equivalent to π
M (1) <=> πT (1). Finally, substituting w(0) and w(1)
from Eq. (12) into πM(1) and πT (0) from Eqs. (A.3) and (A.2) allows us to solve for
fC(γ) = fC(γ; m, L) ≡
√
(1 + m)2 − 2m(m − 1)γ/L − m(4 − m/L2)γ2 + m(1 − γ/L) − 1
2m
,
(A.6)
with fC(γ) <=> f being equivalent to π
M (1) <=> πT (0).
At first, we show that for the relevant parameter space fF (γ) ≥ max{fL(γ), fC(γ)}. For this
purpose it is convenient to consider the cases L ≥ 1/(1 + m) and L < 1/(1 + m) separately. For
L < 1/(1+m) the functions fF (γ) and fL(γ) have a single intersection point in γ ∈ [0, 1] at γ = 1.
The same holds true for the functions fF (γ) and fC(γ). Moreover, we have fF (0) = (1 + m +
m/L)/(1+m)2 > 1 = fL(0) = fC(0), which implies that we have fF (γ) ≥ max{fL(γ), fC(γ)} for
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the relevant parameter space γ ∈ [0, 1]. Turning to the parameter range L ≥ 1/(1 + m), we find
that in addition to fF (1) = fL(1) = fC(1) = 0 there is a second intersection point at γ0(m, L) =
[1 − (1 + m)L]/[L − (1 − L)m] ∈ [0, 1] and fF (γ0(m, L)) = fL(γ0(m, L)) = fC(γ0(m, L)) =
g(γ0(m, L)) = (1 − 2L)/L[(1 − L)m − L] ≤ 1 for 1/(1 + m) ≤ L < 1/2. Finally, taking into
account f ′
F
(1) = f ′
L
(1), f ′′
F
(1) > f ′′
L
(1), and f ′
F
(1) < f ′
C
(1), we have fF (γ) ≥ max{fL(γ), fC(γ)}
for the relevant parameter space γ ∈ [γ0(m, L), 1] with γ0(m, L) ∈ [0, 1].
In the next step we establish that fC(γ) and fL(γ) intersect twice in γ ∈ (max{0, γ0(m, L)}, 1)
if and only if L < L̄(m) with
L̄(m) ≡ m
2[m +
√
2m(1 + m)]
. (A.7)
Note that fC(γ) and fL(γ) intersect at most five times. In addition to the intersection points
at γ = 0 and γ = 1, we have γ0(m, L) = [1 − L(1 + m)]/[L − (1 − L)m] as well as
γ1(m, L) =
m(m − 1) − (1 + m)
√
m[m − 4mL − 4(2 + m)L2]
2m[m + (1 + m)L]
, (A.8)
γ2(m, L) =
m(m − 1) + (1 + m)
√
m[m − 4mL − 4(2 + m)L2]
2m[m + (1 + m)L]
, (A.9)
with γ1(m, L) ≤ γ2(m, L) ∀ L ∈ (0, L̄(m)]. For γ1(m, L) and γ2(m, L) to exist, the discriminant
in both expressions has to be non-negative, which is the case for L ≤ L̄(m). Note that for
L = L̄(m) we have γ1(m, L) = γ2(m, L), which correspond to a tangency point between fC(γ)
and fL(γ). Finally, using the solution for γ1(m, L) and γ2(m, L), it can be shown that γ1(m, L) ∈
(γ0(m, L), 1) and that γ2(m, L) ∈ (max{0, γ0(m, L)}, 1).
In the last step we establish that g(γ) ≤ min{fL(γ), fC(γ)}. Again it is helpful to consider
the cases L ≥ 1/(1 + m) and L < 1/(1 + m) separately. For L < 1/(1 + m) the functions g(γ)
and fL(γ) as well as the functions g(γ) and fC(γ) intersect twice in γ ∈ [0, 1] at γ = 0 and γ = 1.
Thereby, g′(1) > f ′
L
(1) and g′(1) >, f ′
C
(1) guarantee that g(γ) ≤ min{fL(γ), fC(γ)} ∀ γ ∈ [0, 1]
if L < 1/(1 + m). For L ≥ 1/(1 + m) we focus on the relevant parameter space γ ∈ [γ0(m, L), 1]
and find that the functions g(γ) and fL(γ) as well as the functions g(γ) and fC(γ) intersect
twice in γ ∈ [γ0(m, L), 1] at γ = γ0(m, L) and γ = 1. Again, g′(1) > f ′L(1) and g′(1) > f ′C(1)
guarantee that g(γ) ≤ min{fL(γ), fC(γ)} ∀ γ ∈ [γ0(m, L), 1] if L ≥ 1/(1 + m).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Before analysing internal solutions of U(z̃) for z̃ ∈ (0, 1), we focus on the corner solutions at
z̃ = 0 and z̃ = 1. In an equilibrium in which the modern technology is adopted either by no firm
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(i.e. z̃ = 0) or by all firms (i.e. z̃ = 1), we have p(z) = p(0) and, p(z) = p(1), respectively. It
follows from Eq. (14) that indirect utility only depends on real income, such that Ũ(1) > Ũ(0)
may equivalently expressed as [Y (1)/pM (1)]/[Y (0)/pT (0)] = xM(1)/xT (0) = (1 − f)/γ > 1.
Thus, for the relevant parameter space f < 1 − γ we have U(1) > U(0).
We now consider U(z̃) for z̃ ∈ (0, 1). Using pM (z̃) ∀ z ∈ [0, z̃) and pT (z̃) ∀ z ∈ [z̃, 1] from
Table 1 together with w(z̃) from Eq. (12) in Eq. (14) allows us to derive
U(z̃) =
L(1 − z̃f){2[1 − (1 − γ)z̃] − L(1 − z̃f)}
2[1 − (1 − γ2)z̃] +
m(2 + m)(1 − γ)2(1 − z̃)z̃
2(1 + m)2[1 − (1 − γ2)z̃] . (A.10)
In the following we demonstrate that U(z̃) has at most one extremum in z̃ ∈ (0, 1), which
is a maximum. Note that U ′(z̃) = 0 has two solutions at z̃1 = (1 − γΓ)/(1 − γ2) and z̃2 =
(1 + γΓ)/(1 − γ2), with Γ ≡
√
Γ1Γ2 ∈ (0, 1) and
Γ1 ≡
m(1 − γ) − (1 + m){[(1 − f)/γ] − γ}L
m(1 − γ) − (1 + m)fL ∈ (0, 1), (A.11)
Γ2 ≡
(2 + m)(1 − γ) − (1 + m){[(1 − f)/γ] − γ}L
(2 + m)(1 − γ) − (1 + m)fL ∈ (0, 1), (A.12)
for L > [(2+m)/(1+m)](1−γ)/f . Since z̃2 > 1, there exists at most one extremum in z̃ ∈ (0, 1).
We now demonstrate, that if the extremum z̃1 falls into the relevant parameter space z̃ ∈ (0, 1),
it has to be a maximum. Note that limz̃→0 U
′(z̃) > 0 may be equivalently stated as f < f0
U
(γ)
with
f0
U
(γ) ≡ (1 − γ)[2(1 + m)
2Lγ + m(2 + m)(1 − γ) − (1 + m)2L2(1 + γ)]
2(1 + m)2L(1 − L) . (A.13)
It is easily verified that f0
U
(γ) ≥ fF (γ) ∀ γ ∈ (0, 1) if L < L̄(m). Since f ≤ fF (γ) is a
necessary condition for multiple equilibria to exist, we know that for the relevant parameter set
limz̃→0 U
′(z̃) > 0 has to hold. Moreover, we know from above that U(1) > U(0) for f < 1 − γ,
such that we can safely conclude that if z̃1 falls into the relevant parameter space z̃ ∈ (0, 1), it
has to be a maximum.
Finally, to complete the proof, we formulate a sufficient condition for z̃1 ≥ 1, such that U(1) ≥
U(z̃) ∀ z̃ ∈ [0, 1]. Note that z̃1 ≥ 1 if γ ≤ Γ, which may equivalently expressed as f ≤ fU(γ)
with
fU(γ) ≡
L − γ(1 − γ + γ2)
L(1 + γ2)
+
γ
√
1 + γ{γ[3 − 2(1 + m)2L + (1 + m)2L2 + m(2 + m) − (2 − γ)γ] − 2}
(1 + m)L(1 + γ2)
.
(A.14)
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It follows from the inspection of f ′
U
(γ) that fU(γ) has at most three extrema. Accounting for
fU(0) = 1 > fU(1) = 0 as well as for f
′
U
(0) < 0 and f ′
U
(1) < 0, it becomes clear that at most
two of these three extrema can fall into the parameter range γ ∈ (0, 1). From above we know
that fC(0) = 1 > fC(1) = 0, and that f
′
C
(γ) < 0 < f ′
C
(γ) ∀ γ ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, we have
f ′
U
(1) < f ′′
C
(1) as well as f ′
U
(0) = f ′
C
(0) and f ′′
U
(0) > f ′′
C
(0) ∀ L ∈ (1/(m + 1), m/(m + 1)).
Hence, if there is a solution L(m) to the system of equations fU(γ
∗(L, m)) = fC(γ
∗(L, m)) and
f ′
U
(γ∗(L, m)) = f ′
C
(γ∗(L, m)), there exists a unique tangency point γ∗(L, m) between fU(γ) and
fC(γ), implying fU(γ) ≥ fC(γ) ∀ γ ∈ [0, 1]. We plot L(m) in Figure 3, and it is easily verified
that L̄(m), L(m) ∈ (1/(1 + m), m/(1 + m)).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Focussing only on parameter values for which multiple equilibria exist (e.g. L < L̄(m)), we show
that an increase in the number of trading partners m does not result in a transition from an
equilibrium with incomplete industrialisation to an equilibrium with complete industrialisation.
Inspecting Figure 4 and recalling the definition of fL(γ; m, L) and fC(γ; m, L) from Eqs. (A.5)
and (A.6), it is clear that starting out from a multiplicity of equilibria an increase in m does
not cause a transition from an equilibrium with incomplete industrialisation to an equilibrium
with complete industrialisation if fL(γ; m, L) and fC(γ; m, L) are both weakly decreasing in m.
At, first we establish ∂fC(γ; m, L)/∂m ≤ 0 ∀ γ ∈ (0, 1). It can be shown that ∂fC(γ; m, L)/∂m >
0 ∀ γ ∈ (0, 1) is incompatible with L ∈ (0, L̄(m)). Due to proof by contradiction, it hence fol-
lows that fC(γ; m, L) is weakly decreasing in m for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
We now turn to fL(γ; m, L). Let us define L0(m) ≡ (3 − 2
√
2)m/(m + 1) ∈ (0, L̄(m)). Then
for L ∈ (0, L0(m)), the function fL(γ; m, L) has two intersection points with the abscissa at
γ01(m, L) ≡
m − (1 + m)L −
√
[(1 + m)L − m]2 − 4m(1 + m)L
2m
∈ (0, 1), (A.15)
γ02(m, L) ≡
m − (1 + m)L +
√
[(1 + m)L − m]2 − 4m(1 + m)L
2m
∈ (0, 1), (A.16)
with γ01(m, L) ≤ γ02(m, L) ∀ L ∈ (0, L0(m)]. At L = L0(m) the function fL(γ; m, L) has a
unique tangency point at γ01(m, L0(m)) = γ
0
2(m, L0(m)) = [m − (1 + m)L]/2m. Finally, for L ∈
(L0(m), L̄(m)) we have fL(γ; m, L) > 0 ∀ γ ∈ [0, 1) and fL(γ; m, L)|γ=1 = 0. It is easily verified
that ∂fL(γ; m, L)/∂m > 0 ∀ γ ∈ (0, 1) is incompatible with L ∈ [L0(m), L̄(m)). It hence follows
that fL(γ; m, L) is weakly decreasing in m for all γ ∈ (0, 1) as long as L ∈ [L0(m), L̄(m)). For
the parameter range L ∈ [L0(m), L̄(m)) an increase in m hence is associated with a downward
shift in fC(γ; m, L) and fL(γ; m, L). As a consequence, we find that parameter combinations of
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γ and f , which ex ante to the increase in m were associated with a multiplicity of equilibria,
i.e. πM(0) > πT (0) ∧ πM (1) < πT (1) ∧ πM(1) > πT (0), are ex post to the increase in
m associated with one of three possible equilibria types: a unique equilibrium characterised
by no industrialisation, i.e. πM(0) < πT (0) ∧ πM(1) < πT (1) ∧ πM (1) < πT (0), a unique
equilibrium characterised by incomplete industrialisation, i.e. πM (0) > πT (0) ∧ πM (1) <
πT (1) ∧ πM(1) < πT (0), or (as before) by a multiplicity of equilibria with πM (0) > πT (0) ∧
πM(1) < πT (1) ∧ πM(1) > πT (0).
We now turn to the parameter range L ∈ (0, L0(m)). Let us define L̂(m) ≡ m/[2 + m(3 +
m)] ∈ (0, L0(m)), such that L <=> L̂(m) is equivalent to γ1(m, L) <=> 0. It is easily verified
that ∂fL(γ; m, L)/∂m > 0 ∀ γ ∈ (0, γ1(m, L)] is incompatible with L ∈ (L̂(m), L0(m)). It
hence follows that fL(γ; m, L) is weakly decreasing in m for all γ ∈ (0, γ1(m, L)]. Taking into
account that ∂fC(γ; m, L)/∂m < 0 implies that fL(γ; m, L)|γ=γ1(m,L) = fC(γ; m, L)|γ=γ1(m,L)
declines in m. Note that ∂γ2(m, L)/∂m ≤ 0 is incompatible with L ∈ (0, L0(m)). Taking into
account ∂fC(γ; m, L)/∂m < 0 and ∂fC(γ; m, L)/∂γ < 0, it follows that fL(γ; m, L)|γ=γ2(m,L) =
fC(γ; m, L)|γ=γ2(m,L) declines in m. Finally, given that ∂fC(γ; m, L)/∂m < 0, we find that
parameter combinations of γ and f , which ex ante to the increase in m were associated with a
multiplicity of equilibria, i.e. πM(0) > πT (0) ∧ πM(1) < πT (1) ∧ πM(1) > πT (0), are ex post
to the increase in m associated with one of three possible equilibria types: a unique equilibrium
characterised by no industrialisation, i.e. πM (0) < πT (0) ∧ πM (1) < πT (1) ∧ πM(1) < πT (0),
a unique equilibrium characterised by incomplete industrialisation, i.e. πM (0) > πT (0) ∧
πM(1) < πT (1) ∧ πM(1) < πT (0), or (as before) by a multiplicity of equilibria with πM(0) >
πT (0) ∧ πM(1) < πT (1) ∧ πM (1) > πT (0).
Finally, we turn to parameter range L ∈ (0, L̂(m)] for which γ1(m, L) ≤ 0. From above we
know that ∂γ2(m, L)/∂m > 0 ∀ L ∈ (0, L̂(m)], which together with ∂fC(γ; m, L)/∂m < 0 and
∂fC(γ; m, L)/∂γ < 0 implies that fL(γ; m, L)|γ=γ2(m,L) = fC(γ; m, L)|γ=γ2(m,L) declines in m.
Since fC(γ; m, L) > fL(γ; m, L) ∀ γ ∈ (0, γ2(m, L)), we find that parameter combinations of
γ and f , which ex ante to the increase in m were associated with a multiplicity of equilibria,
i.e. πM(0) > πT (0) ∧ πM (1) < πT (1) ∧ πM(1) > πT (0), are ex post to the increase in
m associated with one of three possible equilibria types: a unique equilibrium characterised
by no industrialisation, i.e. πM(0) < πT (0) ∧ πM(1) < πT (1) ∧ πM (1) < πT (0), a unique
equilibrium characterised by incomplete industrialisation, i.e. πM (0) > πT (0) ∧ πM (1) <
πT (1) ∧ πM(1) < πT (0), or (as before) by a multiplicity of equilibria with πM (0) > πT (0) ∧
πM(1) < πT (1) ∧ πM(1) > πT (0).
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